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ABSTRACT (about 300 words) 
Through much of post-colonial history and particularly during the so-called 
‘New Order’ (under General Suharto), Indonesian citizens of ethnic Chinese 
descent have been caught in a strangely ambiguous position: they have enjoyed 
enormous economic power while at the same time being threatened with politico-
cultural effacement. This paper is an attempt to understand that ambiguity in 
relation to the Indonesian cinema – both around questions of industry history and 
around issues of representation of national and ethnic identity on screen. The 
paper traces the presence, the erasure and the absent-presence of Indonesia’s 
ethnic Chinese minority from the establishment of a film industry in Indonesia in 
the 1930s to the post-New Order political shifts, opening up possibilities for a 
new public discourse of Chineseness. I argue however that the openness of 
current Indonesian culture and politics while providing the necessary condition 
for re-imagining the Chinese Indonesians, does not ensure a radical shift in a 
politics of representation, deeply embedded in the textual practices of the film 
industry and more widely in cultural and political history of modern Indonesia. 
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To my knowledge there has been no substantial research on the place of the 
ethnic Chinese minority in Indonesian cinema. At one level this is somewhat 
surprising, as Chinese immigrants had laid the foundations of the Indonesian film 
industry in the 1930s and Chinese finance remained the backbone of the film 
industry through most of its history. This almost total absence of any reference to 
Chinese in much of the cultural and artistic work, including cinema, throughout 
the period of the New Order (1966-98) 2 is easily explained by the Suharto 
regime’s deliberate move to obliterate all public display of Chineseness. Just 
 
about every piece of academic writing on the Chinese in New Order Indonesia 
starts with an acknowledgement of the strangely ambiguous position of the 
Ethnic Chinese: their financial pre-eminence on the one hand, and their politico-
cultural effacement on the other.3  
There are other ways to think about the ambiguity of the Chinese in 
Indonesia specifically in relation to Indonesian cinema. On the one hand the role 
of the ethnic Chinese in the foundation of Indonesian cinema, not just as 
producers, financiers and distributors but also as the creative fount of cinema as 
directors and cameramen4, is undeniable. On the other hand, Chinese Indonesians 
are rarely present as subject matters of film texts even before their absence is 
effectively mandated by government policy under the New Order. On the one 
hand, Teguh Karya (ethnic Chinese) has auteur/guru/star status in the annals of 
New Order cinema, and on the other, there is not a single Chinese character 
across the body of his work. There are parallels here with what Ariel Heryanto 
calls the ‘thematic silence’ of Indonesian literary canon: ‘The national literature 
of Indonesia has been curiously silent about an important aspect in the life of its 
immediate audience: the ethnic tension between the Chinese minority and the so-
called “indigenous” population’ (Heryanto 1997:26).  But the silence seems even 
more thundering in the case of cinema because of the authorial prominence of the 
Chinese throughout the history of the cultural form, and in the New Order 
especially, perhaps because of the towering presence of Teguh Karya – Steve 
Lim – as the pre-eminent nationalist auteur-director of his generation, to whom I 
will return later in the essay.  
 
 The presumed link between a political order and a discursive order which 
underlies this and many other accounts of cultural production begs a question: 
has the political transition in Indonesia from authoritarian rule to democracy seen 
some radical transformation in the construction of the Chinese-Indonesian 
subject? Does democratisation in Indonesia necessitate/require a new narrative 
about the Chinese minority?  
One cannot of course, as many scholars have warned, take the ‘Chinese’ 
(or indeed any other ethnic) minority as a concrete ethnic ‘fact’ in Indonesia. In 
his seminal work on the subject, Charles Coppel defines the ‘Indonesian 
Chinese’ ‘as persons of Chinese ancestry who either function as members of, and 
identify with, Chinese society or are regarded as Chinese by indigenous 
Indonesians (at least in some circumstances) and given special treatment as a 
consequence’ (Coppel 1983: 5).  Benedict Anderson, the pre-eminent theorist of 
nation writes: ‘It is easy to forget that minorities came into existence in tandem 
with majorities – and in Southeast Asia, very recently…. They were born of the 
political and cultural revolution brought about by the maturing of the colonial 
state and by the rise against it of popular nationalism’ (Anderson 2000: 318) Of 
the Dutch East Indies in particular, Anderson writes:  
 
We know from comparing United East India Company (VOC) and 
indigenous records of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries that 
powerful persons whom local courts regarded simply as aristocratic 
officials were denounced by the VOC as “really Chinese”. The Company 
quickly developed a separate jurisprudence for these “Chinese” (who 
 
were clearly unaware of being such…). Growing company power meant 
increasing segregation of the Chinese in terms of legal status, required 
costuming and barbering, residence, possibility of travel and so on. By 
the 19th century these policies had produced in Java a non-Chinese-
speaking ethnic Chinese minority that was increasingly detached from 
any native coalition and hitched to Batavia’s wagon  
(Anderson 2000: 321).  
 
By the early 20th century when films first arrived in Java and Sumatra, these 
Indies Chinese had clearly become an identifiable and material group, who, in 
the context of this industry, were merged into the new Chinese-speaking arrivals 
from China and distinguished from the indigenes both in the diegisis on screen 
and in the material and discursive relationships behind the camera. In other 
words, the inception of Indonesian cinema was heavily marked by the material 
presence of those identified as ‘Chinese’. The question for this paper is if and 
how that marking survived the erasures of the New Order, and of post-colonial 
nationalism more generally.  
 
Early Indonesian cinema 
Ethnic Chinese were involved in the movie business ever since the arrival of the 
first films in the Dutch East Indies. Chinese owned the overwhelming majority, if 
not all, of the earliest movie theatres established in the first three decades of the 
20th century in the cities of Indonesia. By the late 1920s they were both 
importing films from China and producing films in Indonesia. In 1926 and 1927 
 
Dutch directors had produced two feature length films set in the Indies. A film 
industry began emerging from around 1928, coincidentally the year the first of 
the ‘Wong brothers’, Nelson, migrated to Bandung from Shanghai. Three other 
brothers followed soon after and together they dominated the film industry 
through the 1930s along with various ‘peranankan’5 (local born, indigenised, of 
mixed ancestry) Chinese businessmen, who funded their productions. On the best 
available evidence, six feature films were produced in Indonesia in 1928 and 
1929, all of them financed and directed by Chinese men. All of the technicians 
and the majority of actors also appear to have been Chinese. Through the 1930s 
indigenous names begin to appear in the film credits, first as actors and then as 
writers. But of the 40 or so films made in the 1930s (for which there are some 
records), all but seven (directed by Europeans) were produced and directed by 
Chinese.6  
The first indigenous Indonesian directors, editors and art-directors 
appeared in the film industry in 1940 and by the time of the Japanese arrival in 
1942 there were at least five indigenous directors, some of them with several 
films to their credit. Japanese occupation is frequently seen as promoting the 
indigenous population’s role in many walks of life including cinema. The 
Japanese banned all Chinese production companies and began to train a new 
generation of Indonesian film-makers with newer Japanese technology and new 
ideas about the political power of cinema. However, the first indigenous 
Indonesian directors – Raden Arieffin, Anjar Asmara, Suska, Inoe Perbatasari 
and Mohammad Said – all trained within an industry which was funded and 
culturally led by Chinese migrants. Only one of the five was directly engaged in 
 
directing films during the Japanese interregnum but all of them went on to play a 
significant role in the emerging ‘national’ cinema of post-independence 
Indonesia in the 1950s. 
 
A ‘national’ cinema? 
Histories of ‘national’ cinema written by Indonesians often start at the point of 
the emergence of a self-consciously nationalist generation of pribumi or 
indigenous film-makers. This national cinema is defined as post-colonial not 
merely by its autonomy from colonial processes and regulations, but also by 
downplaying the Chinese connection. In practice however Chinese production 
houses were quickly re-established after 1950 and while there were pribumi-
owned production companies (and these are much valorised in the writings about 
Indonesian cinema) there would have been very few films completed and 
released through the 1950s without some funding from Chinese-owned 
businesses.  
But finances apart, the shape of the post-colonial Indonesian film industry 
did seem to have been transformed across the period of Japanese occupation and 
nationalist struggle. The two younger of the Wong Brothers returned to directing 
and producing films in 1948 and as producers remained active into the mid-
1960s. Fred Young, a Semarang-born (Java) Peranakan Chinese was one of the 
most prolific film directors of the early 1950s. Nonetheless, through the early 
1950s much larger numbers of indigenous Indonesians entered the industry in 
particular as actors and directors, but also in all of the technical and creative 
behind-the-camera roles. Only about a quarter or less of the 260 films produced 
 
from 1950 to1955 had any Chinese names listed in the film credits other than as 
producer/financier.  
In the next decade, as the levels of annual film production declined and 
cinema, both industrially and textually, became increasingly enmeshed in the 
national political debates, Chinese Indonesians seemed to all but disappear from 
any significant creative roles both on and off camera.7 Of the 131 films made 
between 1960 and 1965, only two films have Chinese names appear in the credits 
as ‘director’: Sho Bun Seng directed Adolescent Style (Gaja Remadja) in 1960; 
and Fred Young, Behind the Clouds (Dibalik Awan) in 1963. But by the late 
1950s, and particularly after the Name-change Law of 1961 8, Chinese ethnic 
identity could longer be taken for granted on the basis of names in the film 
credits, as some of the Chinese Indonesians  – including those in the film 
industry – adopted ‘indigenous’ names, or pen-names to conform to the 
nationalist discourse of ‘assimilation’. The two most prolific Chinese Indonesian 
director-writers, Tan Sing Hwat and Fred Young (pen name, Utomo), both used 
indigenous sounding names from time to time. Tan Sing Hwat using the 
Javanese-sounding name Tandu Honggonegoro (which he had used occasionally 
since the early 1950s) directed two films in 1961 (In the Valley of Gunung Kawi 
[Dilereng Gunung Kawi], and A Song and a Book [Lagu dan Buku]). Some who 
entered the film industry in the 1950s used exclusively Indonesian names, so that 
increasingly the Chinese could not be identified from film credits in the same 
way that other ethnic groups might be. Chinese names were thus being erased 
from Indonesian cinema even before the arrival of the overt cultural constraints 
of the New Order. From their complete dominance of the industry in the 1930s, 
 
Chinese Indonesian writers, directors and technicians had become a small 
minority by the 1960s, and even that relatively small presence was disguised 
under adopted names and identities. Seen from the point of view of this disguise, 
Lim Tjoan Hok/Teguh Karya seems to inherit the mantle of Tan Sing 
Hwat/Tandu Honggonegoro, though for various reasons (some of which will 
become obvious) it is not a heritage that Teguh would or could ever claim. But 
before turning to the New Order film makers and in particular Teguh Karya, 
something needs to be said about the thematic shifts in film texts. 
 
Themes9 
The Wong brothers’ first film Lily of Java (Melatie van Java, 1927) about forced 
marriage within a Chinese Indonesian family, was reportedly not a commercial 
success. Their second film, Si Conat (name of the villain), by contrast set the 
standards for what would constitute ‘popular film’ for the next decade or so. The 
film’s financial backer Jo Eng Sek selected the story, the tale of an ethnic 
Indonesian villain and an ethnic Chinese hero. The Si Conat story was part of the 
repertoire of lenong, a form of theatre particularly associated with the Betawi 
people, the pre-colonial indigenous population of the area around Batavia (Dutch 
Indies capital), later Jakarta. In the film, the delinquent Conat absconds after 
committing murder. After various adventures, including stealing from a Dutch 
family while working for them, Conat becomes attracted to a young Chinese 
woman Li Gouw Nio, who predictably refuses his advances. This brings him in 
contact with Thio Sing Sang, an expert in Chinese martial arts, who foils Conat’s 
attempt to abduct Nio. The successful formula of this film, with stories drawn 
 
from the repertoires of folk theatre and with lots of good fighting scenes copied 
from Hollywood westerns was repeated several times by the late 1930s, but few 
so clearly pitted a Chinese hero against an indigenous villain. The Wongs’ next 
film following this formula was Si Pitoeng (1931), the Robin Hood of Betawi 
folk lore, a bandit with magical powers that allow him constantly to evade 
capture by the Dutch police.  
Most commonly films seemed to be located within clearly marked 
indigenous or ‘Chinese-Indonesian’ cultural boundaries. Possibly as many as half 
of the films of the 1930s were set almost exclusively within the Chinese 
Indonesian community.10 Only a very few films dealt with indigenous-Chinese 
relations as the main thematic issue. In the 1930s I can find only one film which 
was primarily about inter-ethnic relations. The Rose of Cikambeng (Boonga Roos 
Dari Tjikambeng) was directed in 1931 by one of the most prolific directors of 
the period, The Teng Tjun. The film was based on a serialised novel by Kwee 
Tok Hoay and told the story of a young plantation employee Oh Ay Tjeng, who 
is forced by his father to give up his beloved Marsiti to marry Gwat Nio, the 
daughter of the plantation owner. After an extraordinarily intricate set of tragic 
events and relationships that unfold over two generations, we discover the 
illegitimate daughter of Marsiti and Ay Tjeng with the son of another Chinese 
plantation owner. Stories of arranged marriages were a common romantic 
formula in the 1930s to 1950s and fitted into the wider debate over tradition 
(represented by arranged marriage) and modernity (by romantic love). The theme 
of inter-ethnic relations should have been easy to fit into such a format, and on 
occasions were – but rarely Chinese-Indigenous relations.  
 
The Rose of Cikambeng is most probably the first film about ‘assimilation’ 
(or pembauran). But the kind of assimilation this film promotes is fundamentally 
different (as we will see a little later in this paper) from the premises that 
underlie the official policy of assimilation in post-colonial Indonesia, and in 
particular in the years of the New Order. Suffice it to say at this point that stories 
of ‘pembauran’ involving Chinese-Indigenous relationship or indeed involving 
other migrant groups, such as the Indians or the Arabs (who are by all accounts 
relatively more integrated into Indonesian society, and thus the issue of exclusion 
might be less significant) are very few and far between in the annals of 
Indonesian cinema. Indeed through the 1950s, ethnic identities emerge in films 
primarily via locales; that is, we see explicitly Bataks or Balinese or Betawi 
characters mainly when a story is located in Sumatra or Bali or the rural 
hinterland of Jakarta. Those citizens who cannot be included into the Indonesian 
nation-state in ethno-local terms have quite literally no place in the discourse of 
national cinema from the 1950s onwards. I have touched on the general issue of 
‘ethnicity’ in Indonesian cinema elsewhere (Sen 2003), but a full account of how 
ethnicity is inscribed and proscribed in Indonesian cinema waits to be written. 
Here I want to make just one specific point about the place of the Chinese: in 
1931, The Rose of Cikambeng legitimised the ‘illegitimate’ daughter of a Chinese 
father and native mother; by closing in a happy ending the text gave the child of 
a cross-ethnic union a place in the Indies society. But the story of a Chinese 
father producing an Indonesian child/citizen would not be told until the start of 
the 21st century (which we will get to at the end of this paper). 
 
 
A ‘New Order’ for Indonesian Chinese? 
This silence of cinema, in the New Order period at least, needs to be read in 
the context of the regimes ‘manifestly ambivalent’ (Coppel 2002: 21) policies 
and laws regarding Indonesians of Chinese descent. In the strangely 
discriminatory operations of Indonesia’s laws, both before and after 1965, 
citizenship, in effect passes from generation to generation in the case of ethnic 
Indonesians and indeed to descendants of indigenous father and Chinese-
Indonesian mother, but not to those of Chinese descent or from Chinese father 
and Indonesian mother (‘since paternal citizenship constituted the framework for 
determining children’s legal status’ Aguilar 2001: 519). As the Indonesian 
Chinese cultural theorist Ariel Heryanto puts it  
 
While Chinese males are highly praised for intermarriage, such 
intermarriage does not turn a Chinese groom into an equal fellow citizen. 
Chinese males marrying native women still have to carry special 
identification cards and are subject to various other administrative 
discriminations. Their children are still classed as non-pribumi (non-
indigenous), regardless of how purely native their mothers are. 
(Heryanto 1998: 103) 
 
The New Order’s mode of dealing with ‘the Chinese problem’11 was clear from 
the beginning.  In his very first Independence Day speech as Acting President (16 
August 1967) Major General Suharto called on the ‘ethnic Chinese to abandon 
exclusiveness, to change their names, and in rather threatening tones, [called] on 
 
them not to delay any longer in integrating and assimilating into the Indonesian 
(indigenous) community’ (Coppel 2002: 22) The president’s elaboration of what 
assimilation means is instructive: ‘Integration and assimilation mean 
participating in all activities of the Indonesian people with all their joy and 
sorrow. So physically and mentally there will no longer be a curtain dividing 
Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent and (indigenous) Indonesian citizens.’ 
(Excerpt from Presidential speech cited in Coppel 2002: 30) In the following 
year the ‘Basic Policy on Indonesian Citizens of Foreign Descent’ (Inpres 240, 
1967 see Coppel 2002: 31-47) article 5 urged ‘those who still used Chinese 
names… to replace them with Indonesian’ ones (Coppel 2002: 22). Over the next 
few years a string of laws and decrees resulted in an effective ban on all public 
use of Chinese language, script and all displays of Chinese cultural practices and 
rituals.  
As indicated earlier in the paper, and as Coppel has pointed out, the 
discriminatory treatment of the Chinese can be traced back to the ‘divisive 
colonial legacy’. But the discourse of assimilation is post-colonial and one which 
seems to have been transformed by the New Order in quite fundamental ways. 
Coppel suggests that in the years of Sukarno’s Guided Democracy (1957-65) the 
ethnic Chinese were beginning to be ‘re-imagined’ as ‘an indigenous Indonesian 
ethnic group (…) alongside the hundreds of other ethnic groups in Indonesia’s 
richly multicultural society’. By contrast, the New Order’s assimilationist project 
‘required the ethnic Chinese to lose their Chineseness and to be absorbed without 
a trace into the wider Indonesian population.’ (Coppel 2002: 27) But as Heryanto 
(1998) has argued, this project of the New Order was always self-contradictory, 
 
because the existence within the nation of an identifiable pariah Chinese ‘other’ 
fitted perfectly into the regime’s mode of political control.  
Almost everyone writing on the Chinese in the New Order acknowledges 
their complete exclusion from the political and cultural life of the nation as an 
ethnic group. With the exception of Bob Hasan appointed to  Suharto’s  last 
cabinet, there had never been a ‘Chinese’ cabinet minister in the New Order, 
‘though such ministers were a regular feature (of earlier governments) …. Nor … 
any generals or senior civil servant of obvious Chinese ancestry.’ (Anderson 
1990: 115). On the other hand, it is equally well-documented that the New Order 
provided individual Chinese with opportunities for amassing unprecedented 
amounts of wealth in collusion particularly with the Suharto family, but also 
other politically powerful ethnic Indonesians. It is worth quoting as some length 
here Heryanto’s description of the peculiar location of the Chinese in the New 
Order: 
 
Chinese economic domination reinforced the long-standing antagonism 
of the native population. Periodic anti-Chinese riots have been reported, 
narrated, analysed and remembered as something natural and 
spontaneous, as a populist search for justice. While security officers 
usually act to restore order, in the final analysis the violence serves the 
interests of the regime. It reproduces the Chinese dependence on state 
protection and defers, if not undercuts the potential emergence of a 
domestic bourgeoisie. The violence discredits the popular native efforts to 
express grievances, and deflects anger away from both the state and 
 
sensitive foreign investors. The security apparatus can always play the 
role of hero. 
…. 
Given the importance of ethnic tension in reproducing the New Order’s 
economic growth and political stability, the government’s decision to 
promote the ineffective programme of ethnic assimilation makes sense 
(Heryanto 1998: 102, my emphasis.) 
 
Therefore, he concludes, in the thirty years of the New Order ‘Chinese identities 
are never totally … wiped out, they are carefully and continually reproduced, but 
always under erasure’ (Heryanto 1998:104). 
 
Erased presences in New Order cinema  
Indonesian cinema all but disappeared between 1964 and 1966, in the traumatic 
transition to the New Order. When it revived in the late 1960s and began to 
thrive in the 1970s, two things were clear. First, in New Order-produced 
histories, something called ‘national cinema’ began in 1950, with the work of 
two ‘pribumi’ film-makers, Usmar Ismail (dubbed, in the 1970s the ‘father of 
Indonesian cinema’) and Djamaludin Malik.12 In effect this history erased both 
the Chinese and the left13 from the national and nationalist film history. 
Secondly, reflecting their peculiar position of economic power and cultural 
voicelessness, the ‘Chinese’ owned the overwhelming majority of production 
companies, movie theatres, the import and distribution networks, but could not 
speak openly as ‘Chinese Indonesians’ in the texts of the films they funded. It is 
 
arguable that ethnicity itself became an ‘unspeakable’ of Indonesian cinema, as 
government prescriptions and proscriptions censored and censured all 
discussions of ethnic and religious conflict in the media generally and in cinema 
in particular.14 
Of the 200 or so films of the New Order period that I have seen and more 
that I have a knowledge of from reviews and scenarios, only one film deals 
overtly and substantially with Chinese presence in Indonesia and has an ethnic 
Chinese heroine. Beautiful Giok (Putri Giok) made in 1980 projected the official 
New Order version of both the ‘Chinese problem’ and its solution through a very 
particular kind of ‘assimilation’. A rich Chinese  businessman, Han Liong Swie, 
goes to inhuman lengths to prevent his daughter, Han Giok Nio, marrying an 
‘Indonesian’ (defined as such by the film) young man with immaculate 
credentials. The latter’s very modern and nationalist family, by contrast, 
welcome Giok with open arms. In the end the Chinese father relents and the 
marriage takes place, promising, one assumes, the absorption of this Chinese 
woman into the Indonesian nation, and deligetimizing through the villainous 
Chinese father the discourse of Chinese cultural identity.  
In terms of both popular and critical success, four men dominated the 
1970s: Ami Priyono, Sjuman Djaja, Wim Umboh and Teguh Karya. For all the 
excision of the left and the Chinese, each one of the four bore a connection to 
one or the other of those traditions. Ami Priyono was the son of man who had 
been a minister in Sukarno’s radical nationalist government. Sjuman Djaja had 
received a Soviet government scholarship in the hey days of the Sukarno 
government’s anti-westernism and graduated from Moscow’s famous film school 
 
in 1965. Wim Umboh’s early training was as assistant to Hu, the main director in 
the Golden Arrow, one of the large production companies of the 1950s. Wim was 
reputedly a fluent speaker of Mandarin and acknowledged as his ‘guru’ the 
Golden Arrow proprietor, Chok Chin Hsin.  
Arguably, Teguh Karya was the most influential of the 1970s film-makers, 
in terms of both his legacy to the next generation of Indonesian film makers and, 
more importantly for the purposes of this paper, in defining what constituted 
‘nationalist’ cinema in the New Order. Unlike Wim Umboh, Teguh Karya never 
discussed his Chinese heritage in any public forum. In media interviews and his 
own rare writings he presented himself unproblematically as an Indonesian, who 
had inherited the mantle of national cinema from Usmar Ismail and Djamaluddin 
Malik. His closeness to D. Djajakusuma15 whom he regarded as his teacher and 
intellectual father figure, and in turn Djajakusuma’s closeness to Usmar 
enhanced Teguh’s self-proclaimed descent from the ‘father of Indonesian 
Cinema’. As a nationally and internationally recognised cultural figure, he was 
peerless amongst the Chinese Indonesians of his generation. He can count 
amongst his disciples a veritable ‘who’s who’ of Indonesian cinema and theatre 
in the last decade of the New Order.16 
Teguh Karya was born in rural West Java in 1937. He was named Liem 
Tjoan Hok and later baptised Steve Lim. In his only autobiographical piece, 
published in 1993, Teguh talked for the first time about his parentage in some 
detail: ‘I was the first of five siblings born of mixed parentage between a migrant 
from China and a young girl from Bekasi’ (in the 1930s rural outskirts of Jakarta) 
(Karya 1993: 13). For the next page or so Teguh provides background to the 
 
maternal side of his family and in particular the influence of his maternal uncle 
who was a teacher of Indonesian language. There is only one other mention of 
his father: ‘Although our family was pretty ordinary, it was still categorised as 
prosperous in the village of my birth. So my father was able to buy me a pair of 
shoes to wear to school. But half-way I would hide them in the hole of a big tree. 
So, I went to school bare-feet like all my friends.’ (Karya 1993: 13) Indeed in the 
first line of his autobiographical essay Teguh claims a quite different paternal 
inheritance: ‘D. Djajakusuma, was not just my teacher, but also older brother and 
also father’ (Karya 1993:12).  
It is difficult to write without letting my personal contact with Pak Teguh 
intrude here. That contact was in a way refracted through the constant and 
simultaneous mention and denial of his Chineseness. When I went to interview 
Teguh Karya for the first time, as a post-graduate student in 1979 (I had just 
arrived to do my fieldwork), he had just finished November 1828 (November 
1828, discussed in the next section). With characteristic warmth he drew me into 
the ‘Teater Populer’ family. Within hours, a young woman on the periphery of 
the group had whispered to me ‘you know he is Chinese. But don’t ask him 
anything about it’ (or words to that effect). Over the next few weeks many 
people inside and outside his immediate circle repeated pretty much those words. 
I realised quickly, everyone knew Teguh was ‘Chinese’, that you could only 
whisper this, but more than that, everyone compulsively seemed to whisper this. 
The whisper had a peculiar public manifestation in that the print media would 
often put a bracketed (Steve Lim) next to his name, Teguh Karya! Reading his 
ten-page ‘autobiography’, it seemed to me that when he finally mentions his 
 
Chinese heritage in his own writing, in 1993, he reproduces the same hushed 
mention of his Chineseness which I had heard so many times before – a heritage 
acknowledged only to be immediately downgraded as unimportant.  
Film journalist Marselli Sumarno is probably the only commentator to date 
to note the implications of Teguh’s ethnicity for his film work: ‘Teguh’s 
protagonists are those who are buffeted in the search for identity….This is one 
matter which can be clearly be sourced to the personal history of Teguh, who 
happens to be of Chinese descent, which is a minority community in Indonesia.’ 
(Sumarno 1993:84-85). 
 
Seeing ethnicity in Teguh Karya’s work 
By the time Teguh Karya made his first film, Ballad of a Man (Wajah Seorang 
Laki-laki, literally Face of a Man) in 1971, he had already achieved national 
acknowledgement as the founder and director of the Teater Populer group. 
Wajah, an unusually experimental, low budget and stagey production in the 
context of its time, did not win popular support. It did, however, establish Teguh 
as a credible film-maker, alongside other ‘intellectual’ film-makers of previous 
generations. While Teater Populer continued to stage a few plays through most 
of the 1970s, Teguh’s national and international reputation as a film director 
would far exceed the relatively limited appeal of the work of his theatre group.  
Cinema, much more than theatre, was also Teguh’s vehicle for telling his 
stories. The overwhelming majority of the plays performed by Teater Populer 
since its founding in 1968 (to the mid-1990s, when Teguh’s career effectively 
ended) were translations of western classics. Only one Teater Populer play was 
 
written by Teguh Karya. By contrast, Teguh wrote the scenario for every one of 
his thirteen films (some co-written, all but one with one or other of his 
‘disciples’). Most of the stories were also written or co-written by him and with 
one exception (Kawin Lari, very loosely based on Tenessee Williams’ The Glass 
Menagerie) none of his film stories were foreign derived. It is impossible to 
doubt Teguh’s authorial control over his film work with all characteristically 
being advertised as ‘a Teguh Karya’ film. 
Of his first film Teguh once said ‘This is my self-portrait’ (Kompas 23 
June, 1972 quoted in Sumarno 1993). The film is set in the outskirts of the 
Dutch-Indies capital Batavia in the late 19th century amongst the descendants of 
Portuguese, who were amongst the earliest European traders and adventurers to 
arrive on the island of Java (Ricklefs 2001).  It is the story of Amallo, a young 
man in rebellion against his father, Umbu Kapitan. When the film starts, 
Amallo’s presumably indigenous mother is dead and Umbu, who is of 
Portuguese descent and works for the Dutch, has remarried an Indo (that is part-
Dutch, part native) woman. Amallo hates his father and his Indo wife whose 
mixed heritage is ostensibly no different from Amallo’s own. The film starts with 
the hero being thrown out of his father’s house. Adding an Oedipal turn to the 
story, Amallo becomes involved in sexual relationships first with the mistress of 
a Dutch officer and then in a set of lovingly filmed episodes with Umi, a 
seemingly older (emphatically more experienced) woman who owns the village 
eatery. Amallo’s rebellion against his father quickly takes the form of hatred 
against the Dutch as he helps a band of young gangsters in stealing arms and 
horses belonging to the Dutch, stored on his father’s property. Arrested and 
 
released he returns to the same activities and is betrayed by another gang 
member. In the climactic scene, Amallo is shot by his own father. In the final 
shot, his motherly lover raises her head briefly from his dead body to address 
Umbu: ‘your son’. Amallo’s struggle is futile – he cannot belong to his father’s 
house, nor does he in the final analysis find a place in his mother’s land, except 
in death.  
In 1978, in his longest (nearly three hours), most expensive (it cost, 
according to industry gossip, about twice as much as the average film made that 
year), and most overtly nationalistic film, November 1828 (Nopember 1828) 
Teguh dealt again with the sons of foreign fathers and native mothers, but this 
time on the margins of a nationalist epic about the Java Wars against the Dutch. 
Directed, written and scripted by Teguh, the film swept up all of the major 
awards at the 1979 Annual Film Festival, including those for best Director and 
best film. The advertising described the film as Teguh Karya’s most ‘patriotic’ 
work. Teguh himself described the film as having an ‘important national 
function’ in ‘a country of many islands with diverse cultural traditions’ and 
particularly in making cinema ‘a medium for expressing one’s feelings inspired 
by the call of his motherland’. (Karya 1988: 7) The film was immediately raised 
by official discourse into the status of a classic and an iconic nationalist text. 
November 1828 is set in the second stage of the Java Wars led by the 
Prince Diponegoro, regarded in official nationalist discourse as a precursor to the 
emergence of Indonesia’s national struggle against colonial occupation.17 The 
story unfolds in a Central Javanese village, which the Dutch troops have 
occupied on suspicion of its collusion with the forces of Sentot Prawirodirjo, one 
 
of Diponegoro’s principal lieutenants. The greedy opportunistic village head 
Jayengnegoro turns Dutch spy accusing the respected elder Kromoludiro of 
colluding with the rebel Prince. The revered Islamic teacher, Kiyai Karto Sarjan 
sends his students to inform Sentot about the Dutch occupation of the village. As 
the cruel and ambitious Dutch commander Captain de Borst, the principal 
colonial character and villain of the story, tries through torture to extort 
information from Kromoludiro, Lieutenant van Aaken, second in command on 
the Dutch side declares his own collusion with Sentot. De Borst kills 
Kromoludiro and puts van Aaken under arrest.  
Eventually, forces led by Sentot, using clever strategies and support from 
the surrounding villages defeats the colonial forces. In the closing sequence of 
the film, an advance Javanese force enters the area fortified by the Dutch under 
the guise of a dance troupe. Attack is launched suddenly and simultaneously by 
frenzied dancers inside the fortress and masses of villagers at its gates. Before the 
Dutch commanders can recover from their confusion, the bastions of the fort are 
down and villagers pour in with bamboo spears and bows, laying down their 
lives before the chaotic Dutch fire-power. Just as the Dutch are recovering, 
Sentot rides in, at the head of a well-armed army, the Dutch are beaten, de Borst 
dies a slow, painful, theatrical death. The village is ‘liberated’; Indonesian 
nationalists have out-gunned and out-manoevred the colonial Dutch. This 
liberation connotes the birth of the nation and the union of all sections of the 
society in anti-colonial struggle – the political and military leadership 
represented by Sentot, the artists and intellectuals by the dance troupe, Islam by 
the Kiyai and the common villagers.  
 
But a chink in the national armour (or perhaps this is the sting in Teguh’s 
nationalist tale) appears in the conflict between the Dutch commander de Borst 
and his deputy van Aaken. Unable to bear de Borst’s torture of Kromoludiro, van 
Aaken admits that he rather than the villager has been informing Diponegoro’s 
generals about the movements and plans of the Dutch. In successive flashbacks 
we learn about the two most senior Dutch officers in the film. De Borst the 
fanatical Dutch and van Aaken who has become an Indonesian partisan have 
exactly the same background. Both men spent their childhood in opulent 
mansions with loving Dutch fathers and Indonesian mothers. The child de Borst 
carrying martial toys runs to his fathers embrace. ‘What will you be when you 
grow up’, asks the indulgent father; ‘General’ says child de Borst as his mother 
turns away. The more reflective child van Aaken, in his mother’s arms asks ‘Are 
the Javanese really evil’. His mother: ‘ask your father’, to which his smiling 
father responds, ‘There are no evil people. There are greedy persons… amongst 
the Dutch too.’ The ambitious boy becomes a repressive colonial, and is 
eventually killed by his mother’s people. The other boy lives in a morally 
ambiguous position, betraying the Dutch and never becoming part of the 
Indonesian side either. Van Aaken is killed in the cross-fire in the closing battle 
sequence of the film.  
In the nation that Teguh Karya’s film constructs, there seems to be no 
place for the sons of foreign fathers and indigenous mothers, no matter what 
moral choices the children make, no matter how warmly they embrace their 
mother and her people. In that sense, Teguh’s own biography, as the son of a 
Chinese father is never too far from the surface of the narrative. Every one of his 
 
overtly nationalist films is also an indictment of a system which refused full 
citizenship to those of Chinese descent and simultaneously denied them a place 
to explore their Chineseness. 
 
Finding Chinese fathers’ children  
In the post-Suharto era, some of the most overt legal restrictions on Chinese 
language and culture were removed. A Chinese language press re-emerged in 
Indonesia and there seemed to be a flurry of cultural activity foregrounding 
Chinese Indonesian identity. As part of this flurry, Indonesia’s largest publisher 
Gramedia announced a new initiative, the Peranakan Chinese Literary Series.  
The first novel of the series, Remy Sylado’s Courtesan (Ca-bau-kan), was 
published in 1999. The publishers introduced it as being ‘about the life of the 
community of Chinese descent in Indonesia.’ The publisher’s introduction also 
pointed out that ‘one thing emphasised [in the novel] was the role of several 
members of the Chinese descended community in the history of the Indonesian 
independence movement’ (Sylado 1999: v). The novel was an immediate hit, 
went into a second imprint the very same year and was quickly adapted to a stage 
play and to a film the following year. The novel and the film, written and 
directed by non-Chinese Indonesians, seemed to be self-conscious reform era foil 
to the effective ban on the representation of any but the most trivialised and 
objectionable images of Chinese (and those very few and far between) in 
literature and cinema. The film, directed by Nia di Nata, was released with 
symbolic flourish on Chinese New Year’s day in 2000, being celebrated legally 
for the first time in Indonesia after 35 years of being banned.  
 
The story (and the film) is set in and around the colonial capital Batavia 
from about 1918 to immediately after independence. This history is re-cast by a 
middle-aged woman, Giok Lian (herself a very minor character in the novel and 
even less important in the film), brought up by adoptive Dutch parents in 
Holland, who returns to Indonesia to recover the story of her natural parents: her 
mother Tinung, a girl from a poor, rural Betawi18 background; her father Tan 
Peng Liang a super-wealthy Chinese tobacco trader, criminal and later arms-
smuggler. Giok Lian finds an epic saga, of depravity on the one hand and 
heroism on the other, across generations and also a brother she did not know of, 
who is now a successful businessman in 1970s Indonesia.  
While Tinung and Tan Peng Liang are married, most of the film deals with 
their separate and parallel lives. Through Tinung we see the underbelly of the 
colonial society: a young woman who has no capacity to survive except as a wife 
or courtesan (ca-bau-kan), sometimes protected, and at other times merely 
consumed by men. During the years of Japanese occupation of Indonesia (1942-
45) she is pack-raped by Japanese soldiers. The film does not tell us how her life 
ends, as their story ends with the murder of Tan Peng Liang, the father of her 
children and the love of her life. I have written elsewhere (Sen, forthcoming) 
about the problematic representation of femininity in this film. But for the 
purposes of this paper, I want to focus on the story of Tan Peng Liang, the son of 
a wealthy Chinese businessman and an aristocratic Javanese woman. 
Tan Peng Liang is at one level a scoundrel. He has inherited wealth, which 
he is willing to spend to buy the pleasures of the flesh. He is ruthless in his 
dealings with business rivals, corruptly scheming against them, bribing the Dutch 
 
officials, threatening indigenous journalists and when necessary maiming and 
murdering opponents. The community of Chinese businessmen, whose 
machinations against Peng Liang takes up most of the first half of the film, is 
universally corrupt, ruthless and rich, with little empathy with the Indonesian 
population and its nationalist aspirations. They sell out to the Japanese to 
advance their petty individual interests. There is nothing in this construction that 
departs from the common stereotype of the Chinese community as living in a 
simultaneously isolated and sexually and economically exploitative relationship 
with the majority indigenous population. There is not one Chinese character in 
the film (even including the hero) who is not corrupt, ruthless and rich. The 
pribumi by contrast are normalised across the social spectrum: the poor, the 
prostitute, but also the incorruptible committed journalists, fearless young 
freedom fighters, the Javanese aristocrats. 
The bitter rivalry, involving fraud, arson and murder, between the Batavia 
Chinese merchants and Tan Peng Liang lands the latter in jail. He escapes to 
mainland Southeast Asia, after bribing prison officers and faking his own death. 
From there, he engages his adult sons (from a previous marriage with a Chinese 
woman) in drug-smuggling, which brings him into contact with weapons 
smugglers working for leftist armed movements in Malaysia and Thailand. In 
another peculiarly characteristic stereotyping common in New Order discourse, 
the Chinese protagonist is simultaneously a ruthless capitalist but also in 
dangerous liaisons with communists.  
Yet Tan Peng Liang is ultimately recuperated into honourable Indonesian 
citizenship. The roots of this recovery are in what he has inherited from his 
 
Javanese mother. From time to time the film brings Peng Liang (and us as 
spectators) into the aristocratic, sophisticated and wealthy family of his mother’s 
sister. His close fraternal relationship to his Javanese cousin, the urbane and 
gentle Sutardjo Rahardjo (Peng Liang calls him Mas, elder brother) ultimately 
draws Peng Liang into Indonesia’s nationalist struggle, towards the end of the 
Japanese occupation and the Second World War. At the point of conversion to 
nationalism, Peng Liang talks about the love of land he has inherited from his 
mother. The novel provides the possibility of another history with the briefest 
mention of Tan Tiang Tjing, Peng Liang’s father, who is engaged by the 
Japanese but who also works with the nationalist underground. The film makes 
no reference at all to Tiang Tjing. In the final quarter of the film Peng Liang 
plays a key part in smuggling in arms for an emerging nationalist army which is 
trying to resist the return of the Dutch after Japan’s defeat in the war.  
In independent Indonesia Peng Liang settles down with Tinung and their 
new-born son, as a successful banker. While there is no longer a trace of the 
corrupt ruthless adventurer, his success nonetheless seems clearly premised on 
his relation to his Javanese cousin and his nationalist friends, who now occupy 
high government offices.  
Ca-bau-kan is more centrally about the Chinese Indonesians than any other 
film, not just in the New Order but in post-colonial Indonesia more generally. 
Against the thirty years of New Order exclusion of sons of Chinese fathers from 
inheriting Indonesian citizenship, Ca-bau-kan emphatically finds Tan Peng 
Liang a place in Indonesia’s independence and in independent Indonesia. Yet the 
place it finds is just one very small space, that of a rich businessman, playing 
 
‘younger brother’ to ‘ethnic’ Indonesian bureaucrats, while Chinese Indonesians, 
as a group, remain in the film, as in New Order popular and official discourse, 
demeaned and disenfranchised. 
 
Race and representation 
Robert Stam the foremost theorist of race in cinema has pointed out, much of the 
analysis of representation of race in cinema is engaged in finding ‘stereotypes 
and distortions’ 
as if the “truth” of a community were unproblematic, transparent, and 
easily accessible, and “lies” about that community easily unmasked. Yet 
the issue is less one of fidelity to a pre-existing truth or reality, than one 
of a specific orchestration of ideological discourse and communitarian 
perspective. While at one level film is mimesis, representation, it is also 
utterance, an act of contextualised interlocution between socially situated 
producers and receivers.  
(Stam 2000: 667) 
 
The problem is not that Ca-bau-kan reproduces stereotypical or negative images 
of the Chinese Indonesians. The problem is quite the opposite – that through its 
exceptionally attractive protagonist and its spectacular imagery, it specularises 
and valorises the only legitimate identity available to Chinese Indonesians in the 
New Order, that is as corrupt, successful businessman, supporting the essentially 
indigenous national project. In post-Suharto Indonesia, if the son of a Chinese 
man can now be recuperated into Indonesian citizenship via the love for his 
 
indigenous mother and his son’s indigenous mother, then it is still only into a 
permanently second-class, politically muted, citizenship.   
I have wondered what the most celebrated ethnic Chinese film maker of 
independent Indonesia, Teguh Karya, might have made of the freedom to 
represent his quest for identity in a time where it is possible to speak Chinese and 
about the Chinese publicly. He had had his first stroke before the end of the New 
Order and was deeply upset by stories of anti-Chinese violence that he heard in 
1998. A film like Ca-bau-kan suggests that Indonesians can now make films that 
are centrally about Chinese Indonesians. The right to be represented having been 
re-reclaimed, the struggle must now be about how to be represented, by whom 
and for whose consumption.19 
 
Notes 
                                                 
1 This paper is dedicated to the memory of Teguh Karya, an Indonesian 
nationalist film-maker of great significance and to Bwee, who was with me on 
my last visit to Teguh after his second stroke. Only then did I give up my long 
held ambitions to discuss with him the subject matter of this paper. 
2 The ‘New Order’ was the self-proclaimed name of the authoritarian regime 
which ruled Indonesia from 1966 under the leadership of Major General Suharto, 
until his resignation on 21 May 1998.   
3 Two recent studies which provide excellent reviews of existing research on 
Chinese Indonesians are worth mentioning here: Amy L. Freedman, 2000, 
chapter 4 and Filomeno V. Aguilar 2001. 
 
                                                                                                                                    
4 The gendered language here is used advisedly: there were no camera-women 
working in commercial cinema until the mid-1990s. 
5 Chinese Indonesians are commonly categorised into Peranakan and Totok, the 
latter referring to migrants born in China, as well as implying a greater cultural 
and racial distinctiveness. But these lines of demarcation are not always clear. 
Many of the essays in the book, Perspectives on the Chinese Indonesians, refer 
to the problems of distinguishing these groups in the context of contemporary 
politics (Godley and Lloyd 2001). 
6 The statistical data here and through most of the first half of this essay are 
drawn from J.B. Kristianto’s excellent film catalogue (Kristianto 1995). That 
catalogue itself, as the author explains in the introduction, is incomplete, because 
of large holes in the archival data on Indonesian cinema. Any actual figures in 
this essay, then, need to be treated as approximate rather than exact. 
7 For a detailed analysis of the role that films played in the political dynamics of 
the decade leading up to the Suharto coup of October 1965 see Sen (1985). 
8 For details of this law see Coppel (Coppel 2002: 31-47). 
9 I have seen relatively few films from the pre-1965 period and have not seen 
most of the films referred to in this section. My work here and elsewhere on the 
early history of Indonesian cinema depends on reviews, scenarios and summaries 
in press, detailed references for which appear in Sen, 1994, (Chapter 2). I have 
also depended to a large degree on the summaries provided by JB Kristianto 
(1995). Reconstruction of film content on the basis of summaries is always 
unsatisfactory but, for reasons both technological and political, only a very small 
 
                                                                                                                                    
number of pre-1965 films have survived. Fortunately secondary, written records 
seem to provide enough material for the kind of preliminary argument about the 
on-screen presence and disappearance of Chinese Indonesians being attempted in 
this paper. 
10 As the identifiably Chinese roles disappeared, some of the actors survived 
appearing as non-ethnicised ‘Indonesians’. Perhaps the most enduring star of 
Indonesian cinema was a woman of Chinese descent, Tan Kiem Nio, known by 
her stage and screen name Fifi Young, who dominated the screen from around 
1940 and continued to be one of the most recognised on-screen faces well into 
the 1970s. 
11 It is worth noting that this naming of ‘the Chinese problem’ is not new to the 
New Order, but already in use prior to the Second World War, and indeed 
perhaps part of a wider post-colonial Asian discourse of ‘minority problems’, by 
its very wording shifting the burden of the problem to the minority. 
12 The parallel with the ‘dwi-tunggal’ (two-in-one) founders of the Indonesian 
nation is impossible to miss: Sukarno and Hatta founded the nation, Ismail and 
Malik founded national cinema. Anything prior to that is prehistory to be written 
off in a few paragraphs. 
13 These erasures are not of course exclusive to cinema, and they are intertwined 
in complex ways that are not the subject of this paper. For a discussion of leftist 
film making in Indonesia and its destruction in the aftermath of the 1965 coup, 
see Sen 1994: chs. 2 and 3. 
 
                                                                                                                                    
14 It is impossible to write about the media in Indonesia in the New Order period 
without mentioning the acronym SARA, which was used to refer to the types of 
conflict that the government censored out of the media: S=suku (ethnic), 
A=agama (religious), R=ras (racial), A=antar-golongan (literally ‘between 
groups’ but best read as inter-class). Ramifications of these restrictions have been 
variously discussed; for cinema in particular see Sen (1994: chs. 3,4 and 5) and 
Sen and Hill (2000, ch.5). 
15 D. Djajakusuma, (1918-1987) dancer, film director and a significant cultural 
thinker in Indonesia since the early 1960s. 
16 See for instance the section called ‘Guruku, Sahabatku, Bapakku’ (My 
Teacher, My Friend, My Father)’’, in Riantiarno (ed.) (1993)  Teguh Karya 
&Teater Populer, 1968-1993, where 16 film and stage stars and directors write 
about their debt to Teguh. 
17 For an account of the Java Wars and the historical significance of Diponegoro 
see Ricklefs 2001: 151-4. For a more detailed reading of the film, from a slightly 
different perspective, see Sen 1994: 83-6. 
18 Betawi were the indigenous peasant population of the area which became the 
Dutch colonial capital in Indonesia. The ethnic Betawi population was 
marginalised from the wealth and metropolitan culture of the colonial and later 
national capital. In the 1990s there has been quite a lot of interest in recovering 
the stories of Betawi people in various forms of media texts, including some very 
popular television drama and comedy. 
 
                                                                                                                                    
19 Since the writing of this paper, a new film based on the life and work of Soe 
Hok Gie, an Indonesian intellectual of Chinese descent, has been screened in 
Jakarta: Gie, directed by Riri Reza, produced by Miles Production. I have not had 
the opportunity to see the extent to which this film takes up the challenge of re-
making Chinese identities in Indonesian cultural texts.    
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